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While our conceptual understanding of emotions is largely based on human subjective
experiences, research in comparative cognition has shown growing interest in the
existence and identification of “emotion-like” states in non-human animals. There is still
ongoing debate about the nature of emotions in animals (especially invertebrates), and
certainly their existence and the existence of certain expressive behaviors displaying
internal emotional states raise a number of exciting and challenging questions.
Interestingly, at least superficially, insects (bees and flies) seem to fulfill the basic
requirements of emotional behavior. Yet, recent works go a step further by adopting
terminologies and interpretational frameworks that could have been considered as crude
anthropocentrism and that now seem acceptable in the scientific literature on invertebrate
behavior and cognition. This change in paradigm requires, therefore, that the question
of emotions in invertebrates is reconsidered from a cautious perspective and with
parsimonious explanations. Here we review and discuss this controversial topic based
on the recent finding that bumblebees experience positive emotions while experiencing
unexpected sucrose rewards, but also incorporating a broader survey of recent literature
in which similar claims have been done for other invertebrates.Wemaintain that caution is
warranted before attributing emotion-like states to honey bees and bumble bees as some
experimental caveats may undermine definitive conclusions. We suggest that interpreting
many of these findings in terms of motivational drives may be less anthropocentrically
biased and more cautious, at least until more careful experiments warrant the use of an
emotion-related terminology.
Keywords: arousal, bumblebee, emotion-like state, insect cognition, internal states, invertebrates, motivation,
reward
Whether animals experience “emotions” is a controversial question that has long fascinated
philosophers and scientists (Descartes and Rodis-Lewis, 1994; Darwin, 1998). The key to answering
this question correctly is to define properly the term “emotions” (Gaulin and Mcburney, 2001;
Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006; Kron et al., 2015). In modern cognitive sciences, emotions are broadly
defined as transient subjective states or processes that function in the management of goals and that
involve three distinct components: a physiological response, a behavioral or expressive response
and a subjective experience (Dantzer, 1990; Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 2014). They are described
as intense, short-lived, reactions to specific events or stimuli that can be characterized by two
main dimensional approaches (Russell, 1978, 2003; Kron et al., 2015): arousal (bodily activation
or excitation) and valence (positive or pleasure and negative or displeasure).
While our conceptual understanding of emotions is largely based on human subjective
experiences, research in comparative cognition has shown growing interest in the existence
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and identification of “emotion-like” states in non-human
animals. Direct assessment of the subjective experience of
emotions (i.e., the feeling) or the actual awareness of such
states (i.e., the metacognitive aspect of emotions) is, at present,
not possible in non-speaking subjects. Yet, there have been
several attempts to use behavioral and physiological parameters
as proxy indicators of animal emotions or more generally
internal states (Paul et al., 2005). Accordingly, many behavioral
tasks involving attention, perception, memory, expectation, and
decision making, which are known to be influenced by emotional
states in humans (Mathews and MacLeod, 1994; Lerner and
Keltner, 2000), have been suggested to be reliable tools for
assessing emotions across a wider range of animal species.
In these tasks, scalability (gradation in intensity), persistence
following stimulus or event cessation, valence (positive or
negative), generalization to different contexts and stimulus
degeneracy (different events or stimuli inducing the same
behavior) have been used as main characteristics of emotionally
driven behaviors (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014). Based on these
operational definitions, the past 10 years have seen a burst
of studies claiming the existence of emotions (or “emotion
primitives” sensu, Anderson and Adolphs, 2014) in vertebrates
such as fish (Rey et al., 2015), birds (Bateson andMatheson, 2007;
Matheson et al., 2008; Valance et al., 2008), rats (Harding et al.,
2004), pigs (Douglas et al., 2012), sheep (Doyle et al., 2010), goats
(Baciadonna et al., 2016), and dogs (Mendl et al., 2010), among
others (Baciadonna and McElligott, 2015).
THE CASE OF INVERTEBRATES
This approach has been recently extended to invertebrates
(Bateson et al., 2011; Fossat et al., 2014; Gibson et al., 2015;
d’Ettorre et al., 2017). For example, it has been suggested
that honey bees shaken in a confining tube, which supposedly
simulates a predatory attack, show subsequent “pessimistic”
cognitive biases in decision-making (Bateson et al., 2011; Schlüns
et al., 2016). Crayfish subjected to electric shocks avoid aversive
illuminated arms of an aquatic plus-maze, a behavior that was
interpreted as an “anxiety-like state” (Fossat et al., 2014). Also
fruit flies exposed to repetitive moving stimuli behave as if they
were “frightened” and their internal state was described as being
analogous to fear in humans (Gibson et al., 2015). These accounts
overcome traditional views positing that invertebrates are simple
automatons with reduced behavioral plasticity (Floreano et al.,
2010). Yet, they go a step further by adopting terminologies
and interpretational frameworks that could have been considered
as crude anthropocentrism and that now seem acceptable in
the scientific literature on invertebrate behavior and cognition.
This change in paradigm requires, therefore, that the question
of emotions in invertebrates is reconsidered from a cautious
perspective and with parsimonious explanations.
EMOTIONAL BUMBLE BEES?
In a recent issue of Science, Perry et al. (2016) have revived this
discussion by claiming that bumble bees (Bombus terrestris) show
a positive emotion–like state when they receive an unexpected
sucrose reward, something that previous accounts on bee
foraging behavior may simply have described as an increase
in appetitive motivation (Núñez and Giurfa, 1996; Pankiw and
Page, 2000; Sadler and Nieh, 2011). Perry et al. (2016) used
the classical judgment bias paradigm (Harding et al., 2004),
in which animals are trained to associate a stimulus A with a
reward (CS+) and a stimulus B with the absence of reward, or
a weak punishment (CS−). Thereafter, animals are tested in the
presence of ambiguous stimuli that are intermediate between
A and B (Harding et al., 2004). A positive emotion-like state
is inferred if the animals tend to respond to the intermediate
stimulus as if it were rewarding, i.e., closer to A, whereas a
negative emotion-like state is inferred if the animals reject the
intermediate stimulus, treating it as being equivalent to Perry
et al. (2016) trained bumble bees to forage on two types of
artificial flowers (blue or green) that were either rewarding
(30% sucrose solution) or unrewarding (water only) and that
were positioned at the opposite side of a test flight arena.
After the training, they tested the bees with three additional
ambiguous flowers, which were placed at intermediate positions
and displayed colors lying between blue and green. One group of
bees received an unexpected drop of concentrated (60%) sucrose
solution upon leaving the nest just before entering the test arena,
while control bees received nothing. In this way—the authors
claim—bees experienced a positive emotion-like state induced by
the sucrose consumption before the test.
Bees fed with an unexpected sucrose reward took less time to
land on flowers with ambiguous colors, which was interpreted as
an “optimistic” judgment of ambiguity. Importantly, the authors
considered the possibility that sucrose may have simply excited
the rewarded bees, thus resulting in higher exploration or faster
choice of novel alternatives. To address this crucial point they
measured both the speed of flight and the thorax temperature of
tested bees. They discarded this possibility, although rewarded
bees had a significantly higher thoracic temperature reflecting
an increased foraging motivation (Stabentheiner and Hagmüller,
1991; Farina andWainselboim, 2005; Sadler and Nieh, 2011) and
the arena in which bees had to forage was probably too small
(61 cm length, for an average flight speed of 4–5 m/s) to detect
subtle differences in flight speed between control and rewarded
bees. Given the wide range of flight speeds bees display in the
field (Osborne et al., 2013), further experiments in a larger setup
would be crucial to confirm these observations.
The unanticipated reward also induced bumble bees to
reinitiate foraging faster after a simulated predator attack
achieved via a mechanic trapping mechanism. The authors
concluded that positive judgment biases could be generalized to
different contexts, a fact which was said to support the definition
of emotions in the case of bumble bees (Perry et al., 2016).
Finally, repeating the experiments after blockade of different
biogenic-amine receptors suggested that dopamine was involved
in the signaling of the unexpected sucrose reward. Indeed bees
treated with an antagonist of the dopaminergic system were
slower in their decisions despite having experienced the sucrose
reward. It was concluded that dopamine mediates positive
emotion-like state in bees. This conclusion is puzzling and
remains to be confirmed as it contradicts current knowledge
on reward signaling in bees. Indeed, although sucrose rewards
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are represented via a subset of dopaminergic neurons in the
fruit fly brain (Burke et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2012), this has
never been corroborated in bees where evidence indicates that
octopaminergic neurons accomplish this function (Hammer,
1993; Hammer and Menzel, 1995, 1998; Farooqui et al., 2003).
Interestingly, the authors aimed at blocking—without effects—
the octopaminergic system but the blocker chosen to this end
(mianserin) targets mainly the serotonergic system (Peroutka
and Snyder, 1981) and is, therefore, not specific for octopamine
receptors. This finding should be, therefore, verified using more
specific blockers.
Previous research has established that insects, specifically bees,
possess high levels of cognitive sophistication (Avarguès-Weber
et al., 2011; Collett et al., 2013; Giurfa, 2013; Klein et al., 2017).
From this perspective, it could be tempting to label these novel
findings as emotions in bees, particularly because they seem to
satisfy a number of the criteria identified by the operational
definition of emotions, such as valence and generalization (Rolls,
2005; Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; Mendl and Paul, 2016). Yet,
we maintain that despite this concordance, caution is warranted
before attributing emotion-like states to honey bees and bumble
bees as some experimental caveats (see above) may undermine
definitive conclusions. Thus, a thorough reconsideration of the
evidence available in the bumble bee work by Perry et al. (2016)
let us conclude that from the components defining emotions,
neither the subjective (hardly accessible) nor the physiological
component (due to experimental incongruences, see above) have
been definitively shown in bees. This underlines the necessity
of a terminology deprived of subjective connotations when
describing these results.
REINTERPRETING BUMBLE BEE
PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF
APPETITIVE MOTIVATION
Could a simpler explanation/terminology, like changes in
motivation and arousal, suffice to describe the behavioral
response of bees? While deconstructing the concept of emotions
into basic building blocks (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014)
partially circumvents the claim that the term emotions should
be restricted to those states that include subjective feelings,
interpreting many of these findings in terms of “motivational
drives” may be less anthropomorphically biased and more
cautious, at least until more careful experiments warrant the
use of an emotion-related terminology. Indeed, the findings on
bumble bees could be described as an increase in appetitive
motivation due to an unexpected sucrose reward, which would
lead the bees to accept more ambiguous alternatives than
in the absence of such reward. Numerous works showing
that bees increase their appetitive motivation and exhibit
sensitized behavior upon unexpected positive rewards support
this interpretation and terminology use (Núñez and Giurfa, 1996;
Pankiw and Page, 2000; Sadler and Nieh, 2011). At this stage,
no emotionally loaded terminology would thus be required to
account for the reported performances of bees.
CONCLUSION
Novel findings on bees, flies, and crayfish underline the interest
of invertebrates for research addressing questions about internal
states referring to canonical emotion primitives. Unravelling
certain components of these primitives in invertebrates is
possible given the tractability of their nervous circuits and
brain structures (Menzel and Giurfa, 2001; Menzel, 2012).
Future lines of research may attempt to characterize the brain
activity (neuromodulation and/or activation of population
neurons) of invertebrate animals facing behavioral tasks aimed
at disentangling motivational from emotional explanations. In
doing so, it should not be forgotten that neurotransmission and
neuromodulation are not synonyms for emotions. Although
there may be no emotional experience without participation
of specific combinations of neuromodulators, emotional
experiences cannot be simply equated to neuromodulator
concentrations. This raises the difficulty of employing
terminologies for which not only subjective components
are hardly accessible but also for which neural circuitries do not
allow homologies and straightforward parallels with those of
vertebrates, in particular of humans. In the light of these facts,
caution is needed before adopting terminologies which may
hamper the objective analysis of animal behavior.
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